The constitutional question THE army question was a part of constitutional politics that has to be explained. When Franz Joseph dissolved the Hungarian parliament on December 10 1868, Ferencz Deák and the majority in the House of Representatives could look back with satisfaction on the preceding three years. Deák and his party had reached a constitutional settlement with the Crown that had been enacted as Law XII of 1867. Through the Settlement Hungary, with which Transylvania and Croatia were united, had acquired internal self-government and limited influence in imperial affairs.
The government was headed by the imaginative and entertaining Count Gyula Andrássy, a charmer whom Deák called the 'providential man' 1 because he possessed the rare quality of being equally acceptable to Vienna and to his own country. The government and its parliamentary supporters hoped that, with the Settlement out of the way, concerns about Hungary's position within the Empire would lose their hold over politics. This hope was never fulfilled. The constitutional question, közjogi kérdés (question of public law) acquired paramount importance, becoming almost an obsession in public life. Driven by nationalism, it was concerned with the extent to which Hungary had rights to legal independence, which was the critical aspiration. Debates on Hungary's constitutional rights took up an inordinately large amount of parliamentary time from the beginning to the end (1918) of the Dualist era. Conflicting views on accepting or rejecting the 1867 Settlement reflected politicians' aspirations to improve Hungary's legal position in the Monarchy. This conflict dominated Lá szló Péter parliamentary in its proper sense of being the ultimate source of authority in legislation. The system of mixed government survived. Power was shared between the Crown and parliament, a precarious and shifting balance, as the history of the army question amply demonstrates.
The 1867 constitutional Settlement and the Army
The 1867 Settlement itself was driven by the military demands of the Empire's great-power status. The introduction of universal liability to military service for males was necessary for the maintenance of the Empire's international position. It would have been difficult to introduce this reform without a settlement with Hungary. Deák and Andrássy did not possess the political clout to impose a constitutional settlement on an unwilling monarch, but they did have something indispensable to political success: good luck. The following took place. The disaster the French army inflicted on the Monarchy at Solferino in June 1859 forced Franz Joseph to abandon autocratic government because it could no longer be afforded. Autocracy borrowed to finance itself and its unwillingness to control its expenditure led to the exhaustion of its credit. Since there was no public check on expenditure, foreign banks were ever less willing to help out Austria. Franz Joseph now reintroduced representative bodies. This was not a response to pressure from the 'German' Liberals or Hungarian or Slav nationalists, and the primary aim was not to satisfy the demands of this or that social class or nationality. Constitutional experimentation was necessary because of the demand of the financial houses in western Europe that government expenditure should be publicly accountable. Accountability could be achieved only through constitutional control of finance. The bankers launched a press campaign demanding the reform of government and this put life in the liberals and the nationalists of the Monarchy.
The monarch now revived a dormant institution, the Reichsrat, which the 1860 October Diploma turned into a representative body. The budget could still, however, not be balanced: there was a large deficit each year between 1861 and 1864. The German Liberals, who dominated the Reichsrat, forced cuts in army expenditure. The generals complained that they were denied the means of running an effective army. Then came the war with Prussia. In the autumn of 1864 it became clear to Franz Joseph that, unless Bismarck were stopped by force, Prussia would achieve supremacy in Germany. Ever since 1861, the German Liberals in the Reichsrat were cutting military expenditure. The monarch needed a political lever against the German Liberals to strengthen the Army so that Austria was able to endure a war with Prussia. Deák understood this. In his Easter 1865 article, he clearly stated: 'we are always prepared to harmonize our laws, through legislation, to guarantee the Empire's secure existence.' 6 What attracted Franz Joseph to the idea of a constitutional settlement with the Hungarians was that they provided him with a counterweight to the German Liberals. Faced by an aggressive Prussia, Franz Joseph was prepared to exchange greater Hungarian autonomy against Hungarian support for military expenditure. This support persisted throughout the Dualist era. Hungarian parliamentarians, unlike many in the Reichsrat, did not oppose army expansion as such, even during the crisis years after 1902. (They had to pay less than their Austrian partner for it.) Parliament used its support for army expansion, however, as a trade-off to gain The Army Question in Hungarian Politics recognition of the national identity of the Army's Hungarian units. Paradoxically perhaps, Hungarian aspirations proved, in the long run, more damaging to the Army's effectiveness than the parsimony of the Reichsrat.
Arguments about the status of the Army are the main vehicle for Hungarian nationalism after 1867. One ought not assume, however, that other aspects of constitutional politics were of secondary importance. Common foreign affairs and the monarch's household attracted only temporary interest. But the economic side of the relationship, and particularly the decennial negotiations of the Customs and Commercial Union, like the army question, were contentious throughout the Dualist era. 7 However, the political motive for change in the economy was ambivalent. Strong economic interests favouring, for example, the maintenance of the common tariff system competed with the desire to achieve economic independence from Austria. By contrast, arguments for the existing common rather than a separate Hungarian national army, although sound, secured insufficient support in the country.
Moreover, the Settlement Law put economic subjects and the Army under different regimes. The former were 'public matters of great importance' to be handled jointly with the other half of the Empire on political grounds rather than on account of legal obligation. Hungary retained the right to contract out of any or all of them, save state debts, if agreement with the Other Lands could not be secured.
8 Because obstacles to changes in economic relationships had little to do with the Settlement Law itself and because the Law's economic provisions were more or less straightforward, the scope for constitutional politics here was limited.
This was not the case in army matters. There the provisions were complex and, in contrast to economic subjects, the country's obligations were derived from the Pragmatic Sanction. In army matters the rights of the ország, Hungary as the contracting legal partner of the Crown, were restricted while those of the monarch were wide and 'recognized' rather than defined by the Settlement Law. Yet the monarch's rights were counterbalanced by ország rights, again recognized rather than defined. By and large, control over the Army remained reserved (reservata) to the Crown, the emperor-king, and as such united for the Monarchy as a whole; the raising of the Army continued, however, to be a shared right (communicata) and required the separate consent of the Hungarian parliament.
9 These principles provided ample material for constitutional debate. Indeed, more than any other aspect of the Settlement, it was the army provisions of Law XII of 1867 and the implementing instruments that became the growth points of the constitution. 8 See Péter, 'Verfassungsentwicklung', pp. 326-27. 9 Ibid., pp. 323-25. 10 The House's proceedings concerning the implementing instruments of the Settlement in 1867 and 1868 revealed basic attitudes. The debate over the bill on the state debt was long, even though the government had an impressive two-to-one majority (229 for, 110 against) on December 15 1867, Az országgyu ylés képviselo yházának naplója (hereafter Képv. napló), vol. vi, pp. 150-52. The House showed only limited interest in discussing the bill on the Customs Union. At the close of the general debate on December 17 1867 the vote was taken by rising and the paragraphs had to be held over to the following sitting because the House lost its quorum (of the 402 members only 105 were present), ibid., p. 204. In sharp contrast, interest in the three defence bills was strong and the debate in the House prolonged. But in the end, the government, with Deák's firm support, won easily. At the most important vote, held on August 4 1868, of the 281 members present 235 voted for, 43 against, and 2 abstained, with 120 absent; ibid., vol. ix, pp. 424-26. Lá szló Péter Three laws reforming the Army were put through parliament in 1868, the texts of which were practically identical with the laws passed by the Reichsrat for Cisleithania.
11 Law XL on the system of defence introduced general conscription, a major reform which had strong support in parliament. Universal military service was seen as following from the principle of civil society based on rights and duties applied equally to all. 12 The Law determined the war-time establishment of the Army and fixed the annual contingent of recruits, shared between the two parts of the Monarchy, for ten years. A critical innovation for the maintenance of constitutional balance between Crown and ország was the provision that enlistment had to be agreed annually by parliament.
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Law XLI created the honvédség, a second-line force on which the Hungarians insisted, which, in 1867, Franz Joseph had agreed to set up and which the military and the Austrian politicians took some time to accept.
14 Organized separately from the Army, administratively under the Hungarian Ministry of Defence, the honvédség was a national army substitute. Like the Landwehr in Cisleithania, which had to be set up because of the principle of parity in the Dualist system, it was an (expensive) auxiliary force, and without artillery not yet entirely fit for front-line duty alongside the Army. The honvédség took the oath to the 'Supreme Commander' (not quite the 'king') and to the laws of the country; its personnel, flag, language of service and of command were Hungarian and Croatian. All in all, the Law treated the honvédség as a subject that constitutionally belonged to the shared rather than the reserved monarchic rights. The third instrument, Law XLII of 1868, on the general levy in time of war (and under threat of war) did not attract much constitutional interest.
After the 1867 Settlement
It was the visible presence of the imperial or common Army in Hungary that kept the constitutional question alive. The Imperial Army (later renamed Imperial and Royal), quartered in Hungary, was a multinational army that included the Hungarian regiments. It was largely led by German and German-speaking officers. The Army, including its Hungarian units, were subordinated to the Ministry of War in Vienna rather than to the Hungarian government in Budapest. The maintenance of a large, repressive military force under 'German' leadership in the country, over which the Hungarian government had only limited control would have been a source of conflict under normal circumstances, even without its 'peace-keeping' role at elections and its role in enforcing labour contracts during the harvest. The sensitive question of relations between the civilian population and the 'alien' Army, and the incidents of conflict between soldiers and civilians were a constant headache for the government, and a target easily exploited by the opponents of the Settlement. 15 Yet these 'incidents', important though they must have been, do not provide a sufficient explanation of the role the army question played in Hungarian politics. The cause does not seem to be commensurate with the effect. Furthermore, it is not clear what is cause and what effect. We can only surmise how far the incidents created the army question and how far the already existing army question produced the incidents.
Some disaffection with the Settlement existed in Hungary as early as 1867, and undoubtedly the provisions concerning the common Imperial Army were felt to be the least desirable part of it. 16 The Army quartered in Hungary was involved in conflict, so-called 'incidents', between civilians and troops and relations between the officers and society was tense. 17 In the first decade after 1867 the Army and the honvédség produced lively and occasionally long exchanges in the House, especially in the Address and budget debates. These frequently centred on practical questions and were conducted on political rather than constitutional lines by Tisza's Left Centre Party, although before 1875 it had not accepted the 1867 constitutional basis. It was a widely shared aspiration on both sides of the House that the honvédség should become a first-line military force.
18 It was also hoped that the proportion of Hungarian officers in the Army would increase so that it would become truly 'common'. 19 The hope that the spirit of the Army would not be 'anti-Hungarian' was not confined to the government benches. There was some agitation for Hungarian cadet schools and for the establishment of a Hungarian military academy. 20 The constitutional arguments of the Forty-eighters for a Hungarian national army had not as yet made a strong impact on the House. After the 1875 party realignment, the economic Ausgleich and the consequences of the occupation of Bosnia moved to the foreground of constitutional politics. The smouldering discontent with the 15 Gábor Vermes set out many of the arguments on both sides and described the incidents in his 'Hungary and the Common Army in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy', in S. B. 20 The plan for a Hungarian military academy, in fact an aspiration since 1790, was soon shelved for decades and the proportion of Hungarian officers in the Army did not noticeably improve in the 1870s. Lá szló Péter common Army stationed in Hungary erupted only in the 1880s. 21 From that time onwards, the army question dominated Hungarian politics for well over two decades -even in the 1890s when one after another attempt to distract public interest from it failed.
The army question and Apponyi
The dominance of the army question coincided with, and largely explains, the rise of Count Albert Apponyi, a supporter of the 1867 Settlement. The party structure in the House of Representatives resolves the paradox that a Sixty-sevener brought the army question into prominence. The Independentist groups, so called Forty-eighters, as devoted followers of Kossuth, rejected all common institutions, demanded a separate Hungarian army and recognized only a personal union with Austria. They were led by Daniel Irányi, Ignácz Helfy, Kossuth's confidant, and Erno y Simonyi, members of the entourage of the Great Exile, who returned to Hungary after the Settlement. The Forty-eighters had a growing appeal in the Hungarian districts that sent independent gentry to the House. 22 Yet they had no chance to form a government. Since they did not recognize the 1867 Settlement, the monarch regarded them as nicht regierungsfähig. A party of protest, the Independentists did not even aim to gain office.
Apponyi came from a different political world. The son of György Apponyi, Chancellor before 1848 and arch-enemy of Kossuth, he was educated by Jesuits in Vienna and joined the erstwhile Conservative Sennyey group that supported the government, when in 1872 he acquired a seat in the House. He had plenty in his 'schwarz-gelb' background to live down. After decay set in within the Deák party, a party realignment took place. The Left Centre put their constitutional opposition to the Settlement into 'cold storage' 23 and merged with the governing majority to form the Liberal Party in 1875. For fifteen years Kálmán Tisza was the undisputed leader of the Sixty-sevener majority. A brilliant tactician and debater in the House, Tisza was a master of ad hoc arrangements and not carrying out any political programme. In 1878, the former Conservatives split away and were later joined by dissatisfied Liberals to form the United Opposition and reformed themselves as the Moderate Opposition in 1881 under the joint leadership of Apponyi and Dezso y Szilágyi. A liberal law professor and a loner, a mastiff let loose on the House, Szilágyi's sheer intellectual force in recasting Hungarian constitutional law elevated him to the top rank. Yet Apponyi always had the edge on him. 24 Apponyi's impressive bearing, modulated voice, and his often passionate oratory The Army Question in Hungarian Politics ensured the charismatic appeal of this political Don Quixote and ensures it even today in Hungary.
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Once formed, the new group looked like a political refugee camp rather than a party with a coherent political programme, yet many a politician hoped that it would break the hold of the constitutional question on Hungarian politics, for it unambiguously recognized the Settlement and was therefore regierungsfähig in the eyes of the monarch. And yet, as if it had been the iron law of Hungarian politics, a few years after the party realignment, politics was back where it had been: the forces in parliament were largely separated by different attitudes to the Settlement.
Apponyi's conversion to constitutional politics was gradual. After 1875, his concerns were the economic Ausgleich with Austria, the cutting of army expenditure and the request that 'the Hungarian element should make greater headway in the common Army'
26 -all respectable Sixty-sevener political rather than constitutional questions. During the Eastern Crisis, however, Apponyi gave strong support to Szilágyi's constitutional politics. A new tone was audible in the 1881 election Manifesto of the Moderate Opposition that complained that Tisza's policies undermined public confidence in the Settlement and that national grievances had built up because of the government's 'negligence in the enforcement of guarantees gained in the Settlement and the perversion of its spirit'. 27 In the 1884 Manifesto this became the central contention against 'the governmental system' (which 'perverted and threatened the basis of public law').
28 Nevertheless Szilágyi remained a firm Sixty-sevener and resigned from his party, leaving Apponyi its sole leader.
Barely a fortnight after Szilágyi's resignation in March 1886, Apponyi 29 introduced his most characteristic constitutional innovation, later to be termed the idea of the 'dormant rights' or 'advancement' of the Settlement. He told the House that the country had expected Tisza, because of his past in the opposition, to develop the institutions in a national direction on the basis of what the Settlement had already secured 'in embryonic form'. Whereas the government party had done nothing, his party wanted to use the Settlement to 'build up our national institutions and inject the national spirit into the common institutions'. 30 This idea that combined the 'recognition' of the Settlement, a sine qua non for remaining regierungsfähig, with the promise to fulfil national aspirations turned out to be the thin end of the wedge that eventually shattered majority support for Deák's work from within the Sixty-sevener camp. But this danger looked remote in 1886. In practical terms, the 'revival' ( felélesztés) of 'dormant' rights meant for Apponyi only the modest aim of creating a Hungarian military 25 Not, however, outside Hungary. His political attitudes were described by C. A. Macartney, who otherwise liked him, as 'incurably unadult', The Habsburg Empire 1790-1918, London 1968, p. 761. In Hungary the literature on Apponyi is hagiographic. 26 Election manifesto of the United Opposition (under Apponyi and Szilágyi's leadership), April 13 1878, Mérei, Pártprogr., pp. 251-54. 27 March 23 1881, ibid., pp. 254-58. 28 April 10 1884. The criticism became specific: the government had allowed the competence of the common ministry to be widened (this was a reference to the administration of Bosnia) and made control over it by the Delegations illusory (a reference to a debate in May 1882 on defence costs in relation to Bosnia), ibid., p. 258. 29 Szilágyi resigned on March 21 and Apponyi made his speech on March 24 in the course of the debate on the administration bill which at one point developed into a general debate on government policy. 30 On March 24 1886, Képv. napló, x, p. 313. Apponyi considered that the speech had been a benchmark in his political career, Emlékirataim, i, pp. 140-43. Lá szló Péter academy, which the government, too, had been (unsuccessfully) pressing for. Events pushed Apponyi to spell out his full constitutional doctrine in October in the Jansky Affair debate in the House. 31 On May 21 1886 Ludwig Jansky, a brigadier general, commander of a regiment stationed in Hungary, laid a wreath on General Hentzi's tomb in Buda Castle where Hentzi had fallen in 1849 defending it against Görgey's army (for decades the wreath-laying was an annual event, together with an appropriate speech). On this occasion, the press and the public found the ceremony offensive. The Hungarian government called Jansky's action tactless, but the war ministry (in Vienna) put the Hungarian commander of the army corps in Budapest on the retirement list and promoted Jansky. This provoked serious disturbances in the streets of Budapest and parliament received floods of petitions that demanded legislation for a separate Hungarian army. The monarch sent a friendly rescript to Tisza to help his government.
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Apponyi had a field day in the House. First, he made it clear that his party held no truck with the Forty-eighters who demanded the splitting of the Army. Then he quoted from Franz Joseph's rescript, sent earlier to reduce tension in the country: 'the spirit of the Army could not be different from that of its supreme commander.' Apponyi turned round the monarch's dictum: 'The supreme commander, however, is no other than the crowned constitutional king of Hungary and therefore the spirit of the Army cannot be different from that of the constitutional king.' 33 This was, he went on, indeed a 'postulate to be translated into life', which meant 'the unconditional recognition of Hungary as a sovereign State' by His Majesty's coronation oath and by his sanctioning of Law XII of 1867. This was so much the essence of Hungarian constitutionalism that it was not even necessary to produce further evidence. And it followed that the constitutive factors of the Hungarian State (i.e. king and parliament) possessed unlimited sovereignty over every aspect of state life -including defence. The Army was an institution operated in common with the Other Lands of the Monarchy not because it had been created by a legal source over and above Hungarian state sovereignty, 'but because the sovereign legislation of the Hungarian State found it appropriate, in agreement with the legislature of the Monarchy's other State [that is, the Other Lands], to create this common institution'. This was the spirit of the Hungarian constitution with which the common Army should be in harmony. Then came a sideswipe at the idea, harboured by some people in Cisleithania, that there existed an österreichischer Gesamtstaat, before Apponyi made a further claim. Law XII of 1867 'by which the legislature consented to the maintenance of a united common Army, but did not envisage the Hungarian units' complete loss of individuality within it, for the Law clearly refers to the Hungarian army as a complementary part of the entire Army'. He proposed that the government initiate the measures by which the spirit of Law XII of 1867 was realized in 'creating solidarity between the nation and the Army'. 34 Apponyi used a sledge hammer to crack a nut and what he demanded, in practical terms, was not very clear. Yet his 'postulate' (the term is a throwback to the postulata of the old 31 Gratz, Dualizmus, i, pp. 244-46. See also Vilmos Heiszler 'A Jansky-ügy', in András Gero y (ed.), Skandalum; Magyar közéleti botrányok 1843-1991, Budapest, 1993, pp. 76-91 (a useful account in which, however, the author managed to go through the story without even mentioning Apponyi). 32 Gratz, Dualizmus, i, p. 245. 33 On October 11 1886, Képv. napló, xiii, pp. 188-89. 34 Ibid., p. 192. The phrase 'complemetary part of the entire Army' was in paragraph 11 of 1867 XII, its German translation was, however, 'als integrierenden Teiles des gesamten Heeres'; Ivan Z h olger, Der staatsrechtliche Ausgleich zwischen Österreich und Ungarn, Leipzig, 1911, p. 116. The Army Question in Hungarian Politics constitution) was innovative: never before had a Sixty-sevener politician spelled out in the House the doctrine of the unlimited sovereign power to make statute law. While Apponyi was speaking the government benches were silent but, a year after Apponyi's speech, in 1887, the first textbook of the dogmatic law school by Erno y Nagy, 'the Hungarian Laband' appeared. 35 A follower of Paul Laband, professor at Strasbourg, leading jurist of the German Empire, Nagy turned away from the historical method in favour of the analytical. In fact, Nagy's textbook was written in a conceptual frame similar to Apponyi's and the claim to 'legislative sovereignty', like the claim to 'organic development', became buzzwords in constitutional discourse. National desiderata concerning the Army were from that time onwards supported by the presumption of legislative sovereignty as an attribute of the legally independent Hungarian State.
The watershed: the 1889 Great Defence Debate
It has been widely recognized that the parliamentary debate on the system of defence in the first three months of 1889 was a turning point in the history of the Dualist system. Indeed, the debate did not merely destroy Kálmán Tisza's fifteen years' unchallenged leadership; it transformed politics. Until 1889, the conflicts in the Monarchy could still be regarded as political and temporary; 36 after 1889, they were increasingly recognized as structural and permanent. In Cisleithania, generals and politicians were apprehensive lest there were a drift towards an Armee auf Kündigung, which raised the spectre of Monarchie auf Kündigung. In Hungary the habitually optimistic liberal, Gusztáv Beksics, wrote that 'after 1889 Hungarian politics became a territory of volcanic eruptions'. 37 In the interwar period Gusztáv Gratz, a leading minister in retirement, lamented the 'fateful effect of perturbed political conditions' that had arisen out of the debate in 1889 38 and Apponyi wrote that this was when the Sixty-seven system virtually 'collapsed'. 39 However, we find neither in the contemporary accounts nor in the historical literature any reference to the fact that an indispensable part of the conflict over the system of defence in 1889 was the new constitutional outlook that had emerged in the immediately preceding years. The new outlook was based on the rejection of the idea that Hungary was a part of the Empire as a monarchic union of Lands and on the presumption that Hungary was, by virtue of the 1867 Settlement, a legally independent State. This new claim, shared between Sixty-seveners and Forty-eighters, transformed the outlook of the political class as a whole and made the conflicts over the Army unavoidable. Thus the spectacular clash of political wills in 35 Péter, 'Verfassungsentwicklung', pp. 396-98. 36 Gusztáv Beksics, a leading Liberal publicist, argued in 1883 that the nation no longer had constitutional conflicts, Kemény Zsigmond, a forradalom s a kiegyezés, Budapest, 1883, p. 289; a few years later, he changed his mind. 37 Beksics, who died in May 1906, wrote these lines after the April Pact had been made; he hoped that things were once more improving; see his posthumous A Szabadelvu ypárt története, Budapest, 1907, p. 8; Gottas, Ungarn, pp. 72-74. The movement among university students and the street demonstrators are described by Dániel Szabó, 'A védero ytüntetések résztvevo yi', Korall, 2004, 17, September, pp. 43-60; Hajdu, Tisztikar, pp. 94-97 (good details on incidents). 38 Gratz, Dualizmus, i, p. 407. 39 Emlékirataim, i, p. 169, and repeated in ii, p. 26. Lá szló Péter 1889 had little to do with the Settlement that Deák made with Franz Joseph and much more with the claim to state sovereignty that in the second half of the 1880s was read into Deák's work. Two major objections were raised in the House against the Defence Bill that, after revisions, became Law VI of 1889, and the new constitutional outlook was involved in both. Paragraph 14 of the Bill, obscurely drafted, could be construed as amounting to the weakening of Hungary's right to negotiate the number of recruits raised decennially. 40 This was the context in which Szilágyi was soon to make the claim that 'If agreement is not reached each state retains its freedom of action'. 41 (The Szilágyi thesis was clearly in conflict with Deák's constitutionalism, a contract between Crown and ország based on the Pragmatic Sanction rather than an agreement between two legally independent States.)
The other objection concerned paragraph 25 of the Bill which imposed on the 'one-year voluntary reserve officers' the obligation to pass an examination in German. 42 Apponyi had a field day with this paragraph. 43 The government had argued that paragraph 11, Law XII of 1867 clearly assigned the power to determine the language of the Army to the monarch, and a leading liberal 44 said that the law did not give parliament any control over army language. But, argued Apponyi, the presumption of the law was on the side of parliament 45 and paragraph 11 did not expressly assign the determination of army language to the monarch. 46 The monarch had acted lawfully in accordance with the army language regulations because the other agent of legislation had chosen not to have a say in the matter in 1867. Apponyi made it clear that he did not intend to raise the question of army language. The point was, however, that the language of reserve officers' instruction was 'a part of the sovereign right of our state language' rather than a reserved royal right. Sovereignty was a great principle of the Hungarian constitution, which did not require further legal demonstration. 47 The speech confirmed Apponyi as the standard-bearer of Hungarian aspirations for many years to come.
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Teofil Fabinÿ, Minister of Justice, took up some of Apponyi's points. The language of the Army, the minister insisted (amidst much heckling from the opposition), was a reserved royal right, in contrast to the language of the honvédség where the 1868 Law had expressly recognized parliament's participation. 49 He warned: 'Just as the ország holds fast to its rights, so 40 Tisza insisted for weeks that it did not, but eventually surrendered and restored a passage identical with that of Law XL of 1868 (paragraph 13).
41 See Péter, 'Verfassungsentwicklung', pp. 515-17. In Deák's constitutional outlook, the ország had the right to bargain but also the obligation to seek agreement because of its duty to help its monarch and the Other Lands. 42 The paragraph imposed the obligation to serve a second year if the candidate failed the examination. 43 The speech was frequently interrupted by rapturous applause from his party, the Forty-eighters, and from the gallery. 44 Gyula Horváth who was about to defect and move over to Apponyi's side. 45 March 2 1889, Képv. napló, ix, p. 178. 46 Apponyi also argued that there had been references to the language of army instruction in old statute laws which indicated that the diet had not regarded the subject as a reservata.
47 On March 2 1889 Képv. napló, ix, pp. 178-79 and see his speech in the Jansky Debate in 1886, see note 33 above. 48 The speech on March 2, together with his closing speech, were the most effective of the four speeches that Apponyi made in the defence debate. 49 March 5, ibid., pp. 213-14. The Army Question in Hungarian Politics the monarch's rights should be respected.' 50 This was the language of the old dualist structure: the language of the past. 51 Fabinÿ was out of office within a month, ostensibly on health grounds. Only further research could shed light on the extent to which his robust defence of the monarch's rights embarrassed the government that had been fatally wounded in the debate. Academia clearly did not regret his departure. The doctrine of the Holy Crown was (tacitly) based on Apponyi's 'great principle' and the much respected innovative constructor of this doctrine, Academician Gyo yzo y Concha, referred to Fabinÿ's speech as a 'mistake'. 52 A most telling outcome of the debate in parliament was that Fabinÿ's successor as a Minister of Justice was none other than Szilágyi, the great beast of constitutional politics, brought into Tisza'a last administration to bolster up sagging government authority. The author of the 1893 Szilágyi thesis that Law XII of 1867 was an 'independent creation' of the Hungarian legislature (rather than a so-called internal state contract between partners), could never be described as poacher turned gamekeeper. Not surprisingly, Franz Joseph did his best to get rid of him at the first opportunity.
As an offshoot of the defence debate Tisza was successful in securing the monarch's Handschreiben of October 17 1889 which ordained that in future the Army and navy be styled 'imperial and royal' (rather than 'imperial' or 'imperial-royal'). The monarch's Handschreiben of October 4 1895 extended this change to the 'minister of the imperial house and foreign affairs' which now became 'imperial and royal'. 53 These changes were not innovative. They merely carried into effect what had been implied in the new style introduced by the monarch in November 1868. 54 Although the 1889 and the 1895 documents, in contrast to that of 1868, were countersigned by the addressee, the foreign minister, they should be regarded as unilateral declarations of the monarch's will. Franz Joseph made it clear in his 1889 Handschreiben that the alteration of the official style was not to affect the Einheit und Unzertrennbarkeit of the common Army and navy in the form in which, on the basis of the Pragmatic Sanction, they had been established in 1867. Clearly, these changes could hardly be seen as legally supporting Hungarian constitutional aspirations, particularly after the Great Defence Debate of 1889. 55 50 Ibid., p. 216. On March 6, he said that his duty was 'as much to maintain the monarch's rights unimpaired as to guard the ország's', ibid., p. 249. 51 So was Gyula Andrássy's last political speech, made in the Upper House on April 5 1889. Alarmed by the agitation in the country for an independent Hungarian army, Andrássy produced excellent political arguments for the maintenance of the common Army. Full of common sense, the speech, couched in the language and the constitutional ideas of the monarchic union of Lands, went down well in the Upper House, but the country was moving in another direction, Andrássy Gyula Gróf beszéde a védero y-törvényjavaslat tárgyában, Budapest, 1889, esp. pp. In the 1890s, Szilágyi and Apponyi's constitutional ideas penetrated deep into the political class and transformed its political culture. Historians are yet to recognize that from the 1890s, the three main forces of parliamentary politics, the governing Liberal party, Apponyi's National Party 56 and the Forty-eighter camp, shared a new constitutional outlook in that they all held Hungary and Austria externally as well as internally, to be legally fully sovereign States. The new claim affected Regierungsfähigkeit. The Forty-eighters were, as they always had been, beyond the pale because of their declared aim to abolish the institutions common with the other state. But recognition of the common institutions was no longer enough for a political group to be regierungsfähig because widely different claims could be inferred from the state independence of Hungary explained into Law XII of 1867. 57 Hence the formula established in the negotiations with Apponyi in January 1895: for the monarch Regierungsfähigkeit required the recognition of the Settlement 'as it had been created as well as interpreted and implemented for twenty-eight years'. 58 This requirement for holding office made for tension within the Liberal Party, for, under the spell of Szilágyi and others' new language of politics, Liberals shared the aspiration with Apponyi's group to establish a stronger Hungarian presence in and accentuate the Hungarian character of the regiments of Transleithania. After all, the Dualist system was based on parity between the two halves of the Monarchy, yet, even at the end of the nineteenth century, only a quarter of the army officers were from Hungary and fewer than half of these were Magyars.
The strongest group in the Liberal Party headed by Count István Tisza was, however, determined to avoid any conflict with the Crown. The aristocrats of the Party, led by Count Gyula Andrássy Junior, later labelled the Dissidents, were all loyal to the king. Indeed, in his book (a brilliant defence of the Sixty-seven system), Andrássy argued in 1896 that loyalty to the Crown in itself was not enough: the nation should not ask anything of its king that he, as the constitutional monarch of Austria, could not secure. 59 A few years later, however, Andrássy was trying unsuccessfully to mediate between the Crown and parliament's gentry majority.
Apponyi and his National Party played a decisive role in the unfolding events. As the century moved to a close, without any encouragement from the monarch, but infatuated 56 On January 5 1892 the party replaced the Moderate Opposition with the new name, Mérei, Pártprogr., pp. 261, 270.
57 From 1892, as Mérei points out, even the Liberals included constitutional desiderata in their programmes, ibid., p. 30. 58 See, for example, Apponyi's references to kormányképesség, Regierungsfähigkeit, Emlékirataim, i, pp. 76, 99, 108, 110, 117. After Wekerle's resignation, Khuen-Héderváry, the king's candidate, unsuccessfully sounded out Apponyi about a merger between his party and the Liberals. The recognition of the Settlement 'as it had been created as well as interpreted and implemented for twenty-eight years', was the precondition which the Liberal caucus (but not Apponyi) accepted; Ignácz Darányi in the House on January 19 1895, Képv. napló, xxii, pp. 13-14. Gábor Ugron, Forty-eighter, argued that a uniform interpretation of Law XII of 1867 had never existed (January 21), ibid., pp. 41-44. The Liberal Party, wisely, refused to give hostages to the future by including the formula in its programme. 60 an inexplicable optimism was generated in the gentry-led counties and in parliament that Hungarian army aspirations would be realized. 61 Apponyi's reputation was growing in the Liberal Party 62 and within his own party pressure was growing to merge with the Liberals in order to get into government. In 1899, when the army question was temporarily not in the foreground, Apponyi and his group joined the Liberals and he was elected president of the House. Parliament was now set on a collision course with the Crown.
The Army crisis of 1903
After the turn of the century, the army question came back with a vengeance. The leaders of the Army, concerned that the Monarchy was rapidly falling behind other states in defence, worked out a plan to increase the annual contingent of recruits in keeping with population growth. 63 The army expansion bills went through the Reichsrat only with difficulty, and on the condition that Hungary also passed them. 64 The two army bills introduced by the Széll ministry in November 1902 moderately raised Hungary's defence contribution. Nevertheless, Forty-eighters demanded a quid pro quo: the introduction of Hungarian as the language of command (some seventy words) and the language of service (instruction) in all the regiments of Hungary. The pressure was now on the Liberals to press for at least some of these demands. 65 When the Liberals failed to respond, the Forty-eighters began to carry out obstrukció. The urbane, affable Kálmán Széll, after Wekerle the only Liberal prime minister with a liberal programme of sorts, hoped that the Independentists would tire of their filibustering. Instead, by the end of April 1903, they put his administration into (dog Latin) ex lex. When governments could not put the Appropriation Bill (budget) through parliament in time (which happened frequently), they were covered by an enabling bill, called indemnitás (another misnomer), that authorized them to collect taxes and meet public expenditure. When neither the Appropriation nor an enabling bill had been passed, ex lex obtained (the government put outside the law). This occurred for the first time in 1899, when the Bánffy government was replaced by Széll's. His government, when it could not end parliamentary anarchy and ex lex obtained, was asked to resign by the monarch, under the influence of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and Count Isván Tisza (not that these two ever co-operated). The monarch designated Tisza as the man to take over, but it turned out that the Liberals were not yet ready to reform the Standing Orders to remove obstrukció, which Tisza planned. Then in 60 At every turn in the long crisis between 1902 and 1912, the claim to state sovereignty provided the critical argument in support of the army demands.
61 Gusztáv Beksics's last chapter, 'Harmincz év', in the ten-volume 'millenary history', Sándor Szilágyi (ed.), A magyar nemzet története, vol. x, 1898, reflected this optimism, pp. 807-08. 62 Although the passing of Laws XXII and XXIII of 1897 which raised the Ludovica to the level of a staff college and provided for new cadet schools and a military high school deprived Apponyi's National Party of a large part of its army programme. 63 June 1903, Franz Joseph, in order to end parliamentary anarchy, appointed Count Károly Khuen-Héderváry who was allowed temporarily to shelve the two army bills. Since he still could not restore order in the House, he resigned in August, was soon reappointed but his tenure was cut short by the consequences of Franz Joseph's Ch¢opy Order. Ch¢opy was the village in Galicia where the monarch, attending manoeuvres, issued an army order on September 16, which incensed the Hungarian public. Franz Joseph warned against 'one-sided aspirations' that show no understanding of the great tasks that the Army performed for the benefit of both Staatsgebiete. The use of this phrase coupled (in another passage) with a reference to every Volksstamm of the 'great whole' shocked most Hungarian politicians. The operative passage of the Order read: 'Common and unified as it now is, my Army shall remain, as a strong force that defends the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy against its enemies.' 66 The Order created so much excitement in Budapest that the monarch sent a conciliatory rescript to the Prime Minister Khuen-Héderváry to placate the Sixty-sevener majority. 67 Although Franz Joseph reiterated his determination to transmit the monarch's army rights to his successors unimpaired, he was prepared to implement 'in my royal power' 68 such army reforms as he considered permissible. This led to the appointment of the Committee of Nine by the Liberals. The Committee's report was submitted to the king, after which Franz Joseph, whilst reasserting his right to determine the language of the Army, made the concession that 'the lawful influence of parliament applied to this question as to any other constitutional right'. The subsequent sentence explained: 'Legislation, [agreed by] the Crown and parliament together, could alter this position.' 69 The concession did not amount to much 70 and that was why Apponyi and a part of his group left the Liberal Party.
It was, however, all too much for Cisleithania. While the Ch¢opy Order and its consequences were part of the constitutional discourse, in the strict sense, involving the Crown and parliament, the Koerber-Tisza debate involved 'Austria' and Hungary. The prime minister of Cisleithania, Ernst von Koerber, explained in the Reichsrat that both paragraph 5 of the Delegations-Gesetz and 11 of Law XII of 1867, although using different terms, provided for the monarch's reserved right in maintaining the complete unity of the Army. He then went on to infer from the Hungarian law that in any alteration of the management of subjects that were common to the Monarchy as a whole, Austria possessed the same rights as Hungary. 71 It is difficult to see what, if any, exception could be taken to the speech on the The Army Question in Hungarian Politics basis of the constitutional arrangement framed by Deák in 1867, but Khuen-Héderváry's critical response to it in the House on September 23 was not considered robust enough. He was subsequently defeated on a procedural motion by the House and resigned. This was unprecedented; no government had lost office in this manner before. In came István Tisza, Franz Joseph's last bet, with a carrot and a stick. The carrot was the army programme of the Committee of Nine in which Franz Joseph made minor concessions; the stick was Tisza's determination to revise the House's Standing Orders so that the two army bills could be pushed through. He impressed the House in his response to Koerber's speeches. Tisza had, like most Liberals, accepted the Szilágyi thesis that the Settlement Law was an independent creation with which Koerber's statement was in conflict. And so the Hungarian prime minister brushed off the statement of his Austrian opposite number as: 'to use an English expression, the dilettante utterances of a "distinguished foreigner" to which it would be a mistake to attribute much weight.' 72 Among others, Apponyi (soon to defect from the Liberals to become in 1905 joint leader with Ferencz Kossuth of the Forty-eighters in the House) sent Tisza a letter of congratulation.
The army crisis deepened after 1903. The Committee of Nine programme did not offer enough to provide an acceptable quid quo pro for the higher annual contingent of recruits. The two bills already shelved by Khuen-Héderváry in June could not be brought back by Tisza when he took over in the autumn. 73 However, the monarch did not abandon the army expansion plan and as an ever growing section of the political class demanded (unobtainable) major language concessions from the monarch, the political situation worsened into a constitutional crisis. After Tisza had gone for broke with the Standing Orders revisions 74 and lost, his government became in January 1905 the first ever in central Europe to be forced out of office by the adverse vote of the electorate. 75 The basis of the conflict now became parliamentary government versus mixed constitution rather than solely conflict over army rights. Indeed, after the autumn of 1903, the army question dried up as a source of constitutional innovation, although it still dominated politics.
Since the Liberals, after thirty years of uninterrupted tenure of office, lost their majority in the House, the king had to negotiate with the leaders of the Coalition formed by the Fortyeighter and the Sixty-sevener opposition parties. The king designated Gyula Andrássy Junior as Prime Minister. His efforts to construct a coalition government, however, came unstuck on the demand to introduce Hungarian as the language of command and service in the Hungarian regiments, a demand which Franz Joseph repeatedly rejected. (He well understood that he would otherwise face further demands eventually leading to a separate Hungarian army and also to similar demands made by the Czechs and the Croats.) The monarch was then prepared to appoint Andrássy ad interim before agreement with the majority of the House, which 72 Tisza then referred to point 8 of the Neunerprogramm with the slight 'amendment' that the word 'king' be used rather than 'Crown', see note 70 above. November 18 1903, see TIKB, ii, pp. 98-100. This was the occasion which led Archduke Franz Ferdinand to refer to Tisza as 'dieser Patent-Hochverräter'. 73 Neither Khuen-Héderváry nor Tisza could have formed a government without the (temporary) removal of the army bills from the order of the day. 74 Tisza could carry out the revision of the House's Standing Orders (as in comparable cases elsewhere in Europe) only through infraction of the existing Standing Orders, TIKB, iii, pp. 227-36. 75 In the elections held in January, the Independentists, led by Kossuth and Apponyi, became the largest party, but without an absolute majority. Ibid., iii, pp. 413-16. Lá szló Péter formed a Coalition on army demands. This plan was rejected by the Coalition. 76 The acute political conflict between king and parliament was not resolved by further negotiations in Budapest. The consequent constitutional crisis affected the whole Monarchy and beyond.
In June 1905, Tisza was replaced by Baron Géza Fejérváry. For the first time, Franz Joseph appointed a temporary government 'which stood outside the parties'; 77 it had no parliamentary support. The cabinet no longer served as a buffer; for the first time since 1867, the conflict between the Crown and parliament was laid bare. Although the royal letter and Fejérváry made clear that the government intended to find a successor based on majority support, 78 the House passed a motion of no confidence 79 and declared the government unconstitutional.
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Fejérváry resigned and was reappointed in October with a programme that included a substantial extension of parliamentary franchise to put further pressure on the Coalition to take office on the king's terms. A political compromise was still the main option for the monarch. He had, however, an emergency plan, 'Case U', worked out by the Ministry of War, for the military occupation of Hungary. 81 Because the politicians, supported by the bulk of the political class, continued to resist him for months, Franz Joseph dissolved parliament prematurely in ex lex with military assistance in February 1906. That was a turning point in the crisis. Henry Wickham Steed, The Times correspondent in Vienna, turned out to be right all along: the Coalition was a paper tiger.
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The swing of the pendulum The Coalition surrendered after the basic rule of the constitution was about to be broken. By law, parliament was elected for five years. The king had the right to dissolve parliament, but after a premature dissoloution he had to call another within three months. It became clear, however, after the dissolution in February 1906, that the king's government would introduce by octroi a substantial extension of the franchise before the next parliamentary elections. This reform would have undermined the ascendancy of the gentry in politics. In order to forestall that, the Coalition had to accept office without any concessions being made by the king. Indeed, Franz Joseph, having successfully reasserted his right to appoint the government, set stiff terms on which the Coalition was invited to assume office in 80 Proposed by Dezso y Bánffy, ibid., pp. 469-75. The resolution was passed nem. con. only after the king's rescript that had suspended the sittings had been read out and the government and most of the Liberals had left the chamber. In another resolution the House declared the prorogation of parliament unconstitutional, see per contra Lányi, Fejérváry, pp. 316f, 408f, 415f. The Upper House also condemned the Fejérváry government. 81 The policy options of the government, including the military one, were discussed in a headed the government, Franz Joseph's personal choice, 83 a Sixty-sevener who did not belong to any of the Coalition parties. 84 Parliament was painfully aware that coming to a settlement with the Crown in the previous summer would have secured them better terms. The army question was left hanging even after the April 1906 pact, a temporary truce rather than a proper settlement, which suspended the constitutional crisis. The Wekerle ministry did not commit itself to the higher annual recruitment, 85 nor did parliament abandon the demand for army-language reform. In 1909, the king used the crisis of the Wekerle government to shift parliamentary politics back to the firm supporters of the 1867 Settlement. In January 1910, he appointed Khuen, who enjoyed no parliamentary support. 86 This was, however, not a repetition of the appointment of Fejérváry (which had followed rather than preceded a general election). After tumultuous scenes in the House, sittings had to be suspended and in March, parliament was once more dissolved in ex lex. The general election, however, produced a Sixty-sevener House. 87 The king's gamble had paid off. He was not yet out of the woods, however. The army bill that raised the annual intake (and that the Reichsrat had already passed, although with difficulty, in 1903) 88 was resubmitted in the House in May 1911. As before, the Independentist minority demanded concessions and backed their demand by obstruction. And, as before, the majority began to waver. In March 1912, Khuen resigned and then begged Franz Joseph to give way on one point. 89 The flabbergasted aged monarch authorized the prime minister to leak in Budapest that 'should even the Sixty-seveners side with those who want to curtail one of my most important monarchic rights, I am prepared to abdicate . . . they can then face the consequences'. 90 This blackmail worked. The prospect of Franz Ferdinand's immediate succession scared the wits out of most Hungarian politicians. Khuen finally resigned in April. The king forthwith appointed László Lukács, whose tenure brought the army crisis to an end. In June 1912, by a parliamentary coup engineered by Tisza, who was now in the chair, through which the Standing Orders were toughened up by the new majority, the army bill, which raised the annual contingent of recruits, was, after ten years of conflict, forced through the House without the monarch making concessions to Hungary. 91 As a result, Tisza became a hated man in the political class. When war broke out in 1914, the army question was still hanging over politics. Lá szló Péter Conclusions There are several possible explanations for the army question's dominance over constitutional politics:
(1) At the time of the Koerber-Tisza debate, observers, more sensitive to constitutional forms than we are today, noticed with dismay that the obligations of the contracting parties were set out differently in the Hungarian Settlement Law and in the December Constitution. The discrepancy over the monarch's army rights was particularly glaring. While paragraph 11 Law XII of 1867 'recognized' the monarchic right as 'constitutional', paragraph 5 of the Delegations-Gesetz assigned disposition over the Army 'exclusively' (ausschliesslich) to the monarch. 92 Difficulties over the differences undoubtedly existed from the start, but their importance should not be exaggerated. Paragraph 69 of the Hungarian law stipulated that its clauses regarding the treatment of common matters would come into effect only when 'their content' had been consented to by the Other Lands. The enactment of the December Constitution was seen in Hungary as satisfying what the Hungarian law required and the Settlement came into force in all respects. For as long as the political will existed to interpret the two texts as substantively identical, differences of formulae did not seem to matter that much. Or, to put it differently, the gap between the two texts was not unbridgeable as long as the Hungarian clause retained its original structurally dualistic sense: monarchic reservata by virtue of the constitution. The empire of the Habsburgs, seen in 1867 as a monarchic union of Lands rather than a union of two independent States, did not require identical legal provisions for its proper functioning. Because within the monarchic union Hungary possessed a mixed or balanced constitution rather than parliamentary government, there always existed discrepancies between the dynasty's and the ország's views on their respective rights and obligations. Arguably, for centuries, the discrepancies before 1867 had been much greater than after.
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By the end of the nineteenth century the political will in Hungary to co-operate with the other 'half' of the Monarchy diminished and under the influence of the new constitutional discourse, based on the doctrine of state sovereignty (magyar állameszme), the textual differences exacerbated the conflict but did not create it. Hungary's rights under the 1867 Settlement were reinterpreted in Budapest as much where the text matched that of the December Constitution as where it did not. On the critical point of army rights, after the Settlement Law suffered reinterpretation, 'constitutional' came to mean 'subject to parliamentary influence'. From that point onwards, the Austrian and the Hungarian laws flatly contradicted each other. The clash between the old and the new view on the constitution became manifest in the conflict over the monarch's army Order issued from Ch¢opy and the subsequent Koerber-Tisza debate.
(2) Evidence abounds for the existence of strong Hungarian nationalist sentiment about the Army: its German character was an affront to the Hungarian claim to national independence. Demands for the expansion of the use of the Hungarian language had strong popular appeal. As regards the outcome of the conflict, expectations in the House were unrealistic. When Fejérváry as Minister of National Defence in 1903 observed tongue in cheek that he wished to, but alas could not remake the whole world to meet Hungarian desiderata, he was shouted down by Forty-eighters in the House: 'Yes, we can and we shall.' 94 The opposition was determined 'to wrest national demands' from the Crown. Incidentally, national movements 92 Bernatzik, Die öst. Verfassungsges., p. 443. 93 See Péter, 'Verfassungsentwicklung', pp. 257-58. 94 On January 28 1903, Képv. napló, xi, p. 76. Zoltán Pap and others were the hecklers. The Army Question in Hungarian Politics became more vigorous nearly everywhere in the Monarchy around the turn of the century. The defeat of Russia by Japan and the 1905 revolution that knocked Russia temporarily out of the European balance of power emboldened radical nationalists. As elsewhere in the region, Hungarian nationalist demands were claimed as historic rights. The new concepts, the State, legislation, national independence, legal sovereignty, were all projected into medieval history. Constitutional innovation in Hungary was carried out by reference to pre-existing rights. Yet nationalism by itself cannot provide an adequate account for the conflict over the Army. Nationalism explains too much and at the same time too little. It begs the question: one may accept that the driving force of constitutional politics was nationalism, but one still has to ask why it took the form of the army question.
(3) Perhaps the nature of the Hungarian political class provides the answer. The character of parliament (and particularly of the opposition) was formed by the landed gentry and the 'national intelligentsia' whose social outlook was similar to the gentry's. In the sixteenth century, Werbo yczy had established the convention of viewing the nobility as a warrior class (katona nemzet) whose privileges were based on military virtue: 'unlettered but brave' (not interested in crafts or trade, nor cultivating the arts). Late nineteenth-century political pamphlets still used Werbo yczy's imagery. The 'shield of Christianity' topos found its way as much into Apponyi's political vocabulary in the early twentieth century as it had done into Kossuth's half a century earlier. The noble's sword was more than an accessory to the bearer's social standing; it was even exempted from the bailiff's authority when he requisitioned property -a stipulation in the law on Promissory Notes of 1843. This proud gentry class had unhappily lost its own army in the eighteenth century, except the insurrectio, a hopelessly outdated noble militia. Ever since 1790 the gentry had demanded the return of its army as an essential attribute of the Hungarian 'national genius'. Important though these traditions and memories may have been, they could not have pushed a country to the brink of civil war, as the army question did. The appeal of the army demands also reached far beyond the gentry.
(4) A plausible explanation for the Hungarian language demands is that the Army, based on the German language, did not offer good job opportunities for the gentry. Of the army officers in 1902 only 27 per cent were from Hungary and, as I pointed out earlier, fewer than half of these were Magyar. The rest were either of Swabian or of South Slav origin. 95 Most of the Magyars who entered did not get very far: only a few passed through staff college. The language barrier was a serious handicap. Complaints about the lack of promotion prospects of the 'national intelligentsia' in the Army crop up in speeches in parliament constantly. There are well-documented cases of 'frustrated' young gentlemen leaving the Army. 96 They mention prejudice against them as well as the language barrier. 97 Only the hussars were a preserve of aristocratic and gentry families. But these families avoided the honvédség. In fact, the honvédség, where there was no language problem, attracted the gentry still less than the Army. 98 All in all, something must be wrong with this explanation. 99 How an officer in the supra-national Army selected (or refused to select) a national identity would largely depend on circumstances. The proportion of Magyar officers, low in 1867, was steadily increasing from the 1890s onwards. István Deák's work, Beyond Nationalism, A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps 1848-1918, is a bold attempt to describe the Habsburg Army as an institution 'beyond nationalism' (rather than preceding it). Its religious or ethnic tolerance, towards Jews for instance, was remarkable. 100 The Army was 'more ethnicity blind than biased' 101 and 'if the Joint Army displayed any nationality bias in its promotions, it was in favour of its Magyar officers. This contradicts the incessant complaints of the Hungarian politicians but is nevertheless true'. All in all, promotion was based on higher training courses rather than on social or national background. Germans were promoted in large numbers because they were better educated than the others. 102 The military authorities, goaded on by Hungarian politicians, introduced measures of positive discrimination to alleviate the dearth of qualified applicants from Hungary. Bursaries were widely available. From 1874 onwards, Hungarian Delegation resolutions asked for the establishment of one or more military high schools in Hungary and later demanded the Ludovica Academy, a staff college. In 1875, they asked for a greater use of the Hungarian language in the curriculum and subsequently for regular reports and statistics about the progress of the language. In 1881, the Hungarian Delegation requested that candidates not be turned away from cadet schools because of their poor German. These measures improved the proportion of Magyar officers in the Army. 103 The hard training and the discipline required in military schools was probably more important than the attitudes and the German language in keeping the gentry youth away from the Army. Those who entered and then dropped out might well have blamed their failure on language difficulties and prevailing attitudes unjustifiably. 104 Perhaps it was not so much the gentry putting pressure on the politicians for The Army Question in Hungarian Politics
Undoubtedly the demand to magyarize the language of command was seen by the 'strugglers' and by Franz Joseph as only a first step. On its fulfilment other demands would probably have been made by small groups -though that might have remained ineffective. Since some political bargains between Hungary and the dynasty had lasted in the past at least for one generation, there might have been parliamentary peace for some years. It is more plausible to assume that magyarization was deployed in parliament as a respectable argument to reinforce the army demands rather than being the aim behind them. In sum, the army reforms were intended to impress the non-Magyars, to improve the prestige of the Hungarian State among the nationalities rather than to serve as a practical measure to magyarize them.
(8) The country's political culture and its institutional requirements had much to do with the prominence of the army question. 114 As has been argued earlier, politics in Hungary had for centuries largely consisted of diaetalis tractatus -free bargaining between the royal officials and the ország diet over the requests of the Crown for taxes and recruits in return for dealing with the grievances and the desiderata of the nobility. Providing soldiers and to a lesser extent the supply of money had been for long at the centre of the Crown-ország relationship. 115 The establishment of an 'independent and responsible' ministry greatly modified but did not destroy this structural dualism. Had parliamentary government been introduced in 1867, structural dualism would have disappeared. But Hungary still possessed a mixed or balanced constitution in which the powers of the Crown had been for centuries balanced by the rights of the diet, transformed in 1848 to become a parliament, strengthened with a popular element by the introduction of franchise. But the growth of 'party absolutism' under Tisza, the creation of 'the system' based on an etiolated county and corrupt elections 'perverted' the majority principle. The government was politically more dependent on the Crown than on parliament. All this may have been necessary to maintain the 1867 Settlement, but it forced politics back into old tracks. Since the modern liberal institutions grafted onto the ancient constitution did not work very effectively (there was no attempt, for instance, to impeach the Fejérváry government while in office, which would have been legally possible); the ancient institutions and habits were deployed in counterbalancing the powers of the Crown and its government. The granting of supply retained its role as a constitutional lever, although it could only delay and the force it released was self-destructive. In the Dualist era, direct taxes contributed less than half of the State's annual income. Government could, for a while, easily meet recurrent expenditure from other sources. Parliament's control of public finance turned out to be inadequate. Nor was it effective as a constitutional guarantee.
In contrast, even a temporary gap in the annual authorization by parliament to call up soldiers could damage the machinery of the Monarchy. 116 Whenever the Crown requested more soldiers the cry rose in parliament: 'only in return for compensation' (ellenérték), the fulfilment of some national desiderata. The army rights of the ország enshrined in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Settlement Law were used to counter the royal reservata (paragraph 11) and the Tisza system. But parliamentary obstrukció was the essential lever. Its practice (and even 114 Alan Sked observed that the army question should not be seen as a by-product of nationalism or the nationality question. 'At heart it was probably a constitutional one in the stricter sense of the term', Sked, Decline, p. 197. 115 See Péter, 'Verfassungsentwicklung', pp. 253-55. 116 Ibid., pp. 432-33. Lá szló Péter more the threat of it) was not an aberration of the system but, as some participants observed, its central feature. The 'strugglers' did not allow the majority principle to prevail in the House. They prevented bills from being passed, mounted street demonstrations and petitions to put pressure on the House's majority, drove governments into ex lex, disabled and sometimes even destroyed them. However, they could claim that what they were doing was only a response to the perversion of parliamentarism: the government violated the majority principle by gaining its majority by corrupt elections. Remedies for parliamentary obstruction could not be found easily because of the structural dualism of Hungarian politics. Labouring under a mixed constitution, the Liberals were reluctant to clamp down on the 'strugglers' since that might weaken parliament; they preferred to leave the president of the House weak -otherwise the political balance would be tilted even more towards the Crown. The open conflict in 1905 induced both sides to fall back on the institutions of the past. The king appointed homo regius to negotiate with the Coalition leaders. The counties resisted the implementation of government measures with their traditional guerrilla war of vis inertiae rather than with the forms offered by the laws passed after 1867. The government then sent royal commissars to restore order (a centuriesold practice). Their installation created even more disorder: they suspended the payment of salaries and dismissed elected officials in the king's name with military assistance. The local gentry then occupied the county office, broke the commissar's chair (széktörés, chairbreaking, was an old practice) and sealed the building. Where the gentry were not firmly in the saddle, in the outlying territories with non-Hungarian nationalities, there were few signs of resistance. There was plenty of support for the Coalition in the Hungarian intelligentsia and the lower classes, especially in the countryside. But support in the capital and in the larger towns was feeble. The business classes kept away from the Coalition. The new 'radical intelligentsia', the industrial working classes, their trades unions and the Social Democratic Party were fighting for universal suffrage and gave support to the government in return for promised social reforms. Ferencz Kossuth, in despair, pleaded for the re-establishment of the nádor, an archduke palatine, to mediate between Crown and country. 117 The Coalition, already in a hole, went on digging. When it refused to negotiate terms with the representatives of the Reichsrat (which the 1867 Settlement had provided for), assisted by a honvéd battalion, a 'royal commissar plenipotentiary' was sent by the monarch to parliament to hand over the royal rescript of dissolution. 118 The House was empty. In the Basilica, however, Mgr Molnár, a leading Clerical, (who in December had been photographed sitting aloft the broken benches of the House when Tisza's coup to change the Standing Orders had failed) celebrated a Mass for the Coalition. The Mass, Abbot Molnár announced, was to entreat the Virgin Mary to intercede and to protect Hungary.
In the army question (and only in the army question) the Crown could not be satisfied with a prolonged stalemate. The Habsburg Empire was rapidly falling behind its rivals militarily and the maintenance of its great-power status required a larger and better army. The Hungarian parliament rejected even the Army's modest request for more recruits for over a decade. No other elected assembly in central and eastern Europe was able to stand up to the government
